Ghaemi v. Boulton et al., 2023 HRTO 535 (CanLII)

Date:	2023-04-06
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HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Mohammad-Reza Ghaemi

Applicant

-and-

Bruce Boulton

Respondent

A N D B E T W E E N:

Mohammad-Reza Ghaemi

Applicant

-and-

Nippy Gill

Respondent

A N D B E T W E E N:

Mohammad-Reza Ghaemi

Applicant

-and-

Josie Trlep

Respondent

A N D B E T W E E N:

Mohammad-Reza Ghaemi

Applicant

-and-

Julie Blunden

Respondent

A N D B E T W E E N:

Mohammad-Reza Ghaemi

Applicant

-and-

Jahangir Hossain

Respondent

A N D B E T W E E N:

Mohammad-Reza Ghaemi

Applicant

-and-

Susan Morris

Respondent

DECISION

Adjudicator: Anthony Michael Tamburro

Date: April 6, 2023

File Numbers: 2018-30769-I; 2018-30773-I; 2018-30800-I; 2018-33328-I; 2018-33329-I; 2018-33330-I

Citation: 2023 HRTO 535

Indexed as: **Ghaemi v. Boulton et al.**

APPEARANCES

Mohammad-Reza Ghaemi, Applicant	)))	Self-represented
Bruce Boulton, Respondent	)))	No one appearing
Nippy Gill, Respondent	)))	No one appearing
Josie Trlep, Respondent	)))	Simone Bilato, Counsel
Julie Blunden, Respondent	)))	Self-represented
Jahangir Hossain, Respondent	)))	No one appearing
Susan Morris, Respondent	)))	No one appearing

INTRODUCTION

[1] These Applications allege discrimination with respect to housing on a number of grounds including race, ancestry, place of origin, ethnic origin, disability, creed, sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression, and receipt of public assistance contrary to the *Human Rights Code*, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the "*Code*").

[2] The six instant Applications are amongst more than one thousand applications filed with the Tribunal by this applicant.

[3] The applicant self-identifies as a transgendered lesbian woman and uses the pronouns "she" and "her". Her applications follow a similar pattern. First, the applicant finds an apartment listed on the advertising website "Kijiji" and contacts the landlord. Next, when the landlord invites the applicant to view the apartment, she reveals that she has a characteristic protected by the *Code*, such as receiving payments from the Ontario Disability Support Program ("ODSP") or being

transgendered. Finally, the applicant files an application with the Tribunal claiming that the landlord would not rent the apartment to her based on one or more prohibited grounds of discrimination.

[4] For the reasons that follow, the Tribunal finds that the applicant has persistently instituted vexatious proceedings. As such, the applicant will be declared to be a vexatious litigant and the Applications will be dismissed as abuses of the Tribunal's process for that reason. Finally, the applicant's request for an anonymisation order, a publication ban, and a closed hearing will be denied.

BACKGROUND

[5] On March 26, 2018, the Tribunal issued a Case Assessment Direction ("CAD") in respect of 39 applications filed by the applicant. Included amongst those applications were three of the present Applications (file numbers 2018-30769-I; 2018-30773-I; and 2018-30800-I). That CAD provides a concise introduction to the present issues:

> [6] In this case the Tribunal has identified that the applicant may be a vexatious litigant because she has filed 315 applications, all of which deal with her alleged search for rental accommodation during a one-month period from December 2017 to January 2018. Each application addresses an email exchange with a single landlord. The applicant alleges in each of these applications that when she disclosed that she was in receipt of ODSP, is a transgendered lesbian, her ethnic origin and/or her creed, the potential landlords ceased to communicate with her.
>
> [7] There is reason to be concerned about the applicant's *bona fides* and, therefore, her standing to bring these applications. First, the applicant alleges she applied for apartments in such diverse locations as Thunder Bay, Timmins, Sudbury, Ottawa, Cornwall, Kingston, Windsor, Chatham, London, Niagara Falls, St. Catharines, Hamilton, Toronto and the GTA, even though she was then residing (and continues to reside) in Toronto.
>
> [8] Secondly, in each application, the applicant reports the same emotional distress and impact on her ability to look for further accommodation and to accept a recent job offer with the Canadian Forces, and seeks general damages in the range of $5,000-$40,000 per application (depending on the number of grounds alleged to have been involved in the interaction).

[6] A preliminary hearing was held on May 29, 2018. Unfortunately, the adjudicator who presided at the hearing left the Tribunal before a decision could be issued. During that hearing, however, the applicant indicated that she would withdraw all but 28 of her applications. On June 1, 2018, the Tribunal issued a second CAD with regard to the same 39 applications. By that point in time, the applicant had filed a total of 344 applications.

[7] On June 29, 2018, the applicant filed a document in which she stated that she wished to withdraw 355 applications and would be proceeding with only nine (meaning that the applicant had by then filed 364 applications). Three of those nine applications were incomplete and were administratively closed. The six remaining Applications are those that are presently before the Tribunal.

[8] Also on June 29, 2018, the applicant filed a Request for an Order During Proceedings ("Form 10") in respect of "all filed applications". In her Form 10, the applicant requested anonymisation, publication bans and closed hearings.

[9] As mentioned above, the applicant has continued to file applications. She has now filed in excess of one thousand applications with the Tribunal.

ANALYSIS

Introduction

[10] Subsection 23(1) of the *Statutory Powers Procedure Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.22, as amended ("*SPPA*"), states "A tribunal may make such orders or give such directions in proceedings before it as it considers proper to prevent abuse of its processes". Additionally, Rule A8 of the Tribunal's Rules of Procedure reads as follows:

A8 ABUSE OF PROCESS

A8.1 The tribunal may make such orders or give such directions in proceedings before it as it considers proper to prevent abuse of its processes.

A8.2 Where the tribunal finds that a person has persistently instituted vexatious proceedings or conducted a proceeding in a vexatious manner, the tribunal may find that person to be a vexatious litigant and dismiss the proceeding as an abuse of process for that reason. It may also require a person found to be a vexatious litigant to obtain permission from the tribunal to commence further proceedings or take further steps in a proceeding.

[11] Writing for the majority in *Foy v. Foy (No. 2)*, 1979 CanLII 1631 (ON CA), Howland, C.J.O articulated a number of principles regarding the concepts of abuse of process and vexatious proceedings. Of those, the following are germane to the present matter:

a. legal proceedings have been held to be vexatious because they were instituted without any reasonable ground. As a result the proceedings were found to constitute an abuse of the process of the Court;

b. an action may be vexatious if it is obvious that it cannot succeed or if the action would lead to no possible good;

c. in some cases the Courts have considered the lack of *bona fides* (good faith) in classifying an action as vexatious, as where the plaintiff had no cause of action at all; and

d. a legal proceeding may be vexatious even though there were reasonable grounds for its institution if, for instance, the plaintiff is asking for relief in a way which necessarily involves injustice.

[12] This Decision addresses three issues. First, has the applicant persistently instituted vexatious proceedings? Second, should the applicant be declared to be a vexatious litigant? Third,

should the Tribunal grant the applicant's request for an anonymisation order, a publication ban and a closed hearing?

Issue 1 – Has the Applicant Persistently Instituted Vexatious Proceedings?

Introduction

[13] The Tribunal finds that the applicant has persistently instituted vexatious proceedings for two reasons. First, the Applications were not made in good faith. Second, the applicant is asking for relief in a way which necessarily involves injustice.

The Applications Were Not Made in Good Faith

[14] To establish discrimination under the *Code*, there must be: (1) a distinction based on a prohibited ground; and (2) a disadvantage created by that distinction: see especially *Ontario (Disability Support Program) v. Tranchemontagne*, 2010 ONCA 593 at para. 74.

[15] Section 2 of the *Code* states, "Every person has a right to equal treatment with respect to the occupancy of accommodation, without discrimination because of race, ancestry, place of origin, colour, ethnic origin, citizenship, creed, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression, age, marital status, family status, disability or the receipt of public assistance". The applicant alleges that she was denied housing for a number of reasons, including that she receives payments from ODSP and that she is transgendered. As such, the Applications do indeed allege distinctions based on prohibited grounds.

[16] The key issue, however, is whether those distinctions truly created a disadvantage for the applicant. That is to say, the applicant suffered a disadvantage only if she had a *bona fide* interest in obtaining housing from the landlords in question. For the reasons that follow, the Tribunal finds that the applicant was not genuinely interested in obtaining an apartment from the respondents and, as such, that she suffered no disadvantage.

[17] The present Applications allege that the applicant was denied housing on six occasions over a two-week period (December 19, 2017, to January 2, 2018). The allegations relate to rental units in Ottawa (Vanier), Brampton, Timmins, Kingston, Guelph and Bowmanville. During the hearing, the applicant was asked to explain why she would have a legitimate interest in obtaining rental accommodations in such faraway locations over such a short period of time (for example, Brampton is approximately 700 kilometres from Timmins). She answered that she was "not tied down to Toronto". She stated that she can receive her ODSP payments anywhere in the province and added that she has no job, no family, no relationships, and no educational commitments that would prevent her from moving away from Toronto. She said that apartments outside of Toronto are generally cheaper than those in Toronto, and it made good financial sense to look for apartments away from Toronto. When asked why she had applied for more than a thousand apartments, the applicant said that "nine out of ten landlords will say 'no' to me".

[18] It may be true that apartments in Toronto can be far more expensive than those located elsewhere in the province. However, the Tribunal does not accept that the applicant had a genuine desire to secure the apartments referred to in these Applications.

[19] The applicant has submitted more than a thousand applications to this Tribunal. If, as the applicant says, nine out of ten landlords said "no" to her, the Tribunal can infer that well over a hundred landlords have said "yes" to her. In other words, the applicant has had plenty of opportunities to obtain a more affordable apartment outside of Toronto. She has not, however, availed herself of those opportunities: at the time of the hearing, the applicant said that she continued to live in "random places in Toronto". As such, the applicant's claim that she has a genuine desire to move out of Toronto in order to get a more affordable apartment is simply not credible.

[20] The Tribunal finds that the applicant did not have a good faith interest in obtaining an apartment from the respondents in these Applications. As such, the applicant suffered no disadvantage resulting from the alleged distinctions based on prohibited grounds. That being the case, there is no discrimination under the *Code*, and it is obvious that the Applications cannot succeed.

The Applicant is Asking for Relief in a Way Which Necessarily Involves Injustice

[21] Additionally, the Tribunal finds that the applicant is asking for relief in a way that necessarily involves injustice. That is to say, the applicant included an untruthful statement in some of the Applications in a blatant attempt to increase the monetary compensation that the Tribunal might have awarded to her. In four of the six instant Applications (those relating to respondents Gill, Blunden, Hossain, and Morris), the applicant explained her request for monetary compensation (in part) by saying, "The impact of the respondents [*sic*] actions made it impossible for me to accept my recent job offer from the Canadian Armed Forces ["CAF"] as an Engineer with a starting salary of $49,400/year, or $4,000/month".

[22] During the hearing, the applicant was asked whether the CAF job offer was for the regular force or the reserve force. The applicant answered that she believed it would have been for the regular force. She was then asked if she was aware that the CAF provides housing to its regular force recruits. She answered that she was not aware of that.

[23] The applicant was then asked to explain how allegedly being turned away from apartments in disparate locations including Brampton (respondent Gill), Kingston (respondent Blunden), Guelph (respondent Hossain), and Bowmanville (respondent Morris) could have affected her ability to join the CAF. The applicant admitted that, not only had she not received a job offer from the CAF, she had never even applied to join the CAF. Rather, she said that she had spoken with recruiters and that they had encouraged her to apply.

[24] Based on the applicant's own admission, the Tribunal finds that the applicant's allegation that she had lost a career opportunity with the CAF due to the respondents' actions is a lie. In making that statement on some of the Applications, she was asking for relief to which she was not entitled and was thereby attempting to perpetrate an injustice both on the Tribunal and on the respondents.

[25] But for the applicant's lie in the remedy portion of some of the Applications, it might have been possible to attribute good, albeit misplaced, intentions to the applicant. Due to her untruthful attempt to increase her monetary compensation, however, the Tribunal concludes that the applicant filed her applications, at least in part, to use the Tribunal in order to obtain unjustified financial compensation. Moreover, the applicant's untruthfulness is further proof of her *mala fides* (bad faith) in bringing the Applications.

Conclusion

[26] It is obvious that the Applications cannot succeed: as the applicant did not have a *bona fide* interest in obtaining an apartment from the respondents, she was not disadvantaged and there is no discrimination under the *Code*. Moreover, lying in an application in order to obtain relief to which an applicant is not entitled necessarily involves an injustice. As such, the Tribunal finds that the applicant has persistently instituted vexatious proceedings.

Issue 2 – Should the Applicant be Declared to be a Vexatious Litigant?

[27] In *X v. PayPal Canada Co. (No. 2)*, 2020 BCHRT 210, the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal dealt with an application for costs in the case of a complainant who improperly filed a human rights complaint and thereby impugned the integrity of that Tribunal. At paras. 18-20, that Tribunal made comments that are equally applicable to the present matter:

> This type of deliberate misuse of the Tribunal's scarce resources is serious. This Tribunal exists to resolve complaints about discrimination. Those complaints engage people's ability to meaningfully access and participate in social life in the province with dignity and respect. While not every complaint filed with the Tribunal is successful, generally speaking, complainants seek recourse through this process because they feel aggrieved and are seeking a resolution.
>
> X chose to fabricate a human rights complaint, in part, because there is no filing fee for doing so. Again, this is a serious misuse of scarce public resources. It perpetuates a very harmful perception that the Tribunal's process can be used as a tool to extort respondents, with little or no risk to complainants. As I have previously recognized elsewhere, "Where a person seeks to use the Tribunal's process as a weapon to extort or bully another person or organization into a financial settlement, it undermines the credibility of the process and the significance of the rights at issue": *Colbert v. North Vancouver*, 2018 BCHRT 40 at para. 85; see also *Horn v. Norampac (No. 2)*, 2009 BCHRT 243 at para. 112. It undermines the Tribunal's integrity and the purposes for which it has deliberately refrained from imposing a filing fee: to ensure cost is not a barrier to a person filing a good faith complaint of discrimination. This is conduct deserving of rebuke.

X's conduct has impugned the reputation of the Tribunal and wasted scarce resources which could more properly have been used to resolve good faith complaints of discrimination. It is improper and I find it warrants an award of costs. I turn now to the appropriate amount.

[28] As is the case in British Columbia, there are no fees to file an application with this Tribunal. The absence of filing fees certainly increases the public's access to the administration of justice. Anyone, no matter how impecunious they may be, can file an application with this Tribunal in order to protect and enforce their rights under the *Code*. The downside of this model is that there is no financial disincentive to filing numerous vexatious applications, as this applicant has done.

[29] Moreover, and unlike the case in British Columbia, this Tribunal cannot order costs. In Ontario, tribunals may order a party to pay another party's costs in a proceeding only if that tribunal has made rules with respect to costs: *SPPA* s. 17.1(2)(b). This Tribunal has no such rules. Again, this means that there is no financial disincentive to filing numerous vexatious applications. The Divisional Court addressed this reality in *Papouchine v. Touram LP d.b.a. Air Canada Vacations*, 2022 ONSC 7010 at paras. 4-5, as follows:

> Tribunals, like courts, are custodians of a scarce public resource: time before the tribunal. Meritorious complaints cannot proceed promptly if frivolous complaints clog the system and waste resources. Some tribunals, including the Tribunal, do not charge fees to initiate and pursue a complaint, and some do not order legal costs in favour of unsuccessful parties. These practices facilitate access to justice, but they may also create a false impression that justice is "free" and that there are no constraints on matters that may be brought forward for adjudication.
>
> Justice is not free. Quite the contrary. Justice is expensive. To the extent that the cost of justice is not borne by the parties, it is borne by the public purse. Tribunals, like courts, are responsible for overseeing their own processes so that public resources are applied effectively to matters worthy of adjudication. To achieve this, tribunals, like courts, must control their own processes, including restraining vexatious conduct and abuse of process.

[30] Indeed, as there are no filing fees and the Tribunal cannot order costs, one of the few mechanisms available to the Tribunal to stem the filing of vexatious applications is the ability to declare an applicant to be a vexatious litigant. This was addressed by the Tribunal in *Freitag v. Penetanguishene (Town) et. al.*, 2015 HRTO 1275 at para. 57:

> The Tribunal's Rules allow it to control its own process. The Tribunal has found that in exceptional circumstances, it has the power to declare a person to be a vexatious litigant and to prevent an applicant from filing an Application without first obtaining consent of the Tribunal. See *Drenic v. Governing Council of the Salvation Army*, 2010 HRTO 1667, at paras. 16 and 18-19 and *Roy v. Toronto (City)* 2014 HRTO 214. The Tribunal's power to prevent the abuse of its processes, including declaring an applicant to be a vexatious litigant, is at the heart of both its statutory mandate to control its proceedings and its specialised expertise. This is especially important in a direct access system where the Legislature has chosen not to require filing fees or to impose costs sanctions. In *Dai v. Presbyterian Church in Canada*, [2013 ONSC 6650 at paras 19-21], the Divisional Court confirmed the Tribunal's power to make a vexatious litigant declaration, finding, in that particular case, that a declaration was "well within the range of reasonable and acceptable outcomes defensible in respect of the facts and the law."

[31] The applicant has persistently instituted vexatious proceedings in an attempt to weaponise both the *Code* and the Tribunal in order to extort funds from the respondents. In so doing, she has both undermined the Tribunal's integrity and tarnished its reputation. Moreover, in lying on at least four of the Applications, she has conducted proceedings in a vexatious manner. As such, this is one of those exceptional circumstances in which the Tribunal will declare the applicant to be a vexatious litigant and the Applications will be dismissed as abuses of the Tribunal's process for that reason.

[32] Additionally, the applicant will be required to obtain permission from the Tribunal to commence further proceedings or take further steps in any proceeding.

[33] Finally, any unprocessed applications filed by the applicant that are held currently by the Tribunal will not be processed. Any unprocessed application filed by the applicant in hardcopy will be returned to the applicant. Any unprocessed application filed by the applicant electronically will be deleted.

Issue 3 – Should the Tribunal Grant the Applicant's Request for an Anonymisation Order, a Publication Ban and a Closed Hearing?

[34] As alluded to above, the applicant has filed a Form 10 requesting the following: anonymisation (using the initials "A.U."), a publication ban (that would include the name of the applicant, the name of witnesses, as well as any reference to the applicant's gender identity, gender expression, or sexual orientation), and a closed hearing. Respondents Trlep and Hossain oppose the applicant's request. At the hearing, respondent Blunden took no position on this issue.

[35] In her Form 10, the applicant stated:

> The reason I am requesting that my name be anonymized is out of fear for my personal safety. My gender identity, gender expression and sexual orientation are not acceptable in my religion of Islam and by the Muslim community, and in some cases punishable by death. Thus, I may potentially be subject to risks, threats, or acts of physical and even sexual assault and/or other forms of violence or death if my identity or relevant identifiable characteristics about me were publicized in the event of a public decision.

[36] During the hearing, the applicant conceded that the risk of physical harm to her was negligible as long as she remains in Canada. She said, however, that one of her religious obligations is to perform the hajj, the pilgrimage to Mecca. She said that, if she was to perform the pilgrimage, and if she was somehow connected to the Applications, her safety might be put at risk. She added that the Canadian government would not be able to protect her if she were to travel to Saudi Arabia.

[37] The Tribunal may make an order to protect the confidentiality of personal or sensitive information where it considers it appropriate to do so: Rule 3.11. Such orders, however, constitute a restriction on the open court principle.

[38] The Supreme Court of Canada addressed the importance of the open court principle in *Sherman Estate v. Donovan*, 2021 SCC 25 ("*Sherman Estate*"). At para. 30 of that decision, the Court

stated, “Court openness is protected by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression and is essential to the proper functioning of our democracy […]”.

[39] Indeed, given the importance of the open court principle, the Tribunal’s hearings are presumptively open to the public: *SPPA* s. 9; Rule 3.10. Moreover, all written decisions of the Tribunal are available to the public: Rule 3.12.

[40] In *Sherman Estate*, the Court reaffirmed the test for discretionary limits on presumptive court openness at para. 38:

> […] In order to succeed, the person asking a court to exercise discretion in a way that limits the open court presumption must establish that:
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> (1) court openness poses a serious risk to an important public interest;
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> (2) the order sought is necessary to prevent this serious risk to the identified interest because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent this risk; and,
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> (3) as a matter of proportionality, the benefits of the order outweigh its negative effects.
>
> Only where all three of these prerequisites have been met can a discretionary limit on openness – for example, a sealing order, a publication ban, an order excluding the public from a hearing, or a redaction order – properly be ordered. This test applies to all discretionary limits on court openness, subject only to valid legislative enactments […] [citation omitted]

[41] Also in *Sherman Estate*, the Court went on to acknowledge (at para. 96) that “there is an important public interest in protecting individuals from physical harm” and stated that the issue is whether the applicant has “established a serious risk to this interest for the purpose of the test for discretionary limits on court openness”. The Court added (at paras. 97-98):

> […] direct evidence is not necessarily required to establish a serious risk to an important interest. This Court has held that it is possible to identify objectively discernable harm on the basis of logical inferences […] But this process of inferential reasoning is not a licence to engage in impermissible speculation. An inference must still be grounded in objective circumstantial facts that reasonably allow the finding to be made inferentially. Where the inference cannot reasonably be drawn from the circumstances, it amounts to speculation […]
>
> […] it is not just the probability of the feared harm, but also the gravity of the harm itself that is relevant to the assessment of serious risk. Where the feared harm is particularly serious, the probability that this harm materialize need not be shown to be likely, but must still be more than negligible, fanciful or speculative. The question is ultimately whether this record allowed the application judge to objectively discern a serious risk of physical harm. [citations omitted]

[42] On the facts of this case, the Tribunal cannot infer the existence of a serious risk of physical harm to the applicant. The applicant did not state that she has immediate plans to perform the hajj, or even that she has definite plans to perform the hajj. Rather, she said that she “may” one day perform the hajj and that there would be a risk to her safety “if” she did so. While the feared physical harm is grave, the probability of this harm occurring is merely speculative. As such, the applicant’s requests for a publication ban and an order excluding the public from the hearing will be denied.

[43] The applicant has also requested an anonymisation order. The Tribunal's "Practice Direction on Anonymisation of HRTO Decisions" provides that the Tribunal may anonymise the name of a party to protect the confidentiality of personal or sensitive information where it is appropriate to do so. However, such an order is made only in exceptional circumstances. As the Divisional Court stated in *Stepanova v Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario*, 2017 ONSC 2386 at para. 36, "[…] it remains the general principle that the open court principle trumps desires for anonymity, and to overcome this general principle, a litigant must do more than make bald assertions about potential risks for them if their names are published". As stated above, the probability of physical harm occurring to the applicant during a trip to Saudi Arabia is merely speculative. As such, the request for anonymisation will also be denied.

[44] There is another reason that it would be inappropriate for the Tribunal to grant an anonymisation order, a publication ban, or a closed hearing in this matter. In *Toronto Star v. AG Ontario*, 2018 ONSC 2586 at para. 111, the Court stated:

> […] emphasizing privacy over openness not only has a negative impact on the press but also affects other stakeholders. Regulators have no way of identifying chronic offenders, reference checks on tenants and others who come before the various tribunals are impossible to carry out. Problematic landlords, police and other actors, including repeat human rights offenders, vexatious litigants and the like cannot be discovered by members of the public who have to engage with them […] [emphasis added]

[45] The issue of anonymising decisions relating to vexatious litigants was addressed in *Stein v British Columbia (Workers' Compensation Appeal Tribunal)*, 2020 BCSC 772. In that case, at para. 28, the Court said, "There is a public interest in allowing information as to how [the petitioner] has conducted herself to remain freely available. That factor weighs strongly against the judgment being anonymized. To take that step would undermine the force and effect of [the petitioner] having been found to be a vexatious litigant".

[46] In this case, the applicant has instituted vexatious proceedings in an attempt to extort funds from numerous landlords. Other landlords should know about the applicant's behaviour. For that reason too, the applicant's request for an anonymisation order, a publication ban, and a closed hearing will be denied.

ORDERS

[47] The applicant's request for an anonymisation order, a publication ban, and a closed hearing are denied.

[48] The applicant, Mohammad-Reza Ghaemi, is declared to be a vexatious litigant and the Applications are dismissed as abuses of the Tribunal's process for that reason.

[49] Any unprocessed applications filed by the applicant that are held currently by the Tribunal will not be processed. Any unprocessed application filed by the applicant in hardcopy will be

returned to the applicant. Any unprocessed application filed by the applicant electronically will be deleted.

[50] The applicant may not commence further proceedings or take any further steps in an already commenced proceeding without first obtaining permission from the Tribunal.

[51] If the applicant seeks leave to file future applications, she must include with her complete application submissions that outline why the application: (a) is intended as a legitimate assertion of her *Code* rights; (b) is not intended to vex the respondent(s); and (c) will not result in an abuse of process.

Dated at Toronto, this 6th day of April, 2023.

"Signed by"

_____

Anthony Michael Tamburro
Vice-chair